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Federalism at war: Putin’s blame game, regional governors, and the invasion of Ukraine

Stanislav Klimovich

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2024, vol. 40, issue 4, 262-277

Abstract: Center–regional relations in Putin’s Russia are marked by strict hierarchies, with regional governors serving as agents to the principal–the federal center. This (authoritarian) mode of federalism allows the federal center to maintain the president’s popularity, by shifting blame for policy failures from the presidency onto other federal political institutions and the regions. The article investigates how the regime reacted to the full-scale warfare against Ukraine. It theoretically elaborates on strategies of blame avoidance in personalist and federal autocracies and applies this framework to the Russian case. Using data from official documents and media reports, it demonstrates that the federal center again resorted to vertical blame-shifting, by formally and informally assigning the regional governors with several unpopular tasks, above all – casualty reporting and mobilization. The war confirmed center–regional relations as a practical venue for blame avoidance, which helps Putin’s regime overcome crises, contributing to its coping resilience.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2024.2352978

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