Policy space and regional predilections: Partisanship and trade agreements in Latin America

Robert Galantucci

Review of International Political Economy, 2014, vol. 21, issue 3, 710-734

Abstract: Several prominent political economy models of trade policy, at first glance, seem to suggest that leftist governments in Latin America have strong incentives to sign preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The Heckscher-Ohlin model, for instance, predicts that the ideological left in the developing world will favour trade liberalization. Other research, specifically on trade agreements, suggests that leftist governments sign such treaties to credibly signal a commitment to sound economic policies. In light of these predictions, it is perhaps surprising that many left-wing Latin American governments have been especially averse to signing PTAs. In this article, I provide an explanation for the partisan left's disposition toward trade agreements. First, I identify the ways in which PTAs can be difficult to reconcile with hardline or populist left-wing governance. Second, I explore the conditions under which left governments are most inclined to sign trade agreements. I anticipate that regional commonalities and shared partisanship increase the prospects for cooperation. A statistical analysis of PTA signing in 18 Latin American countries, as well as a more in-depth treatment of several cases, yields results consistent with my expectations. These findings have implications for the literature on the political economy of trade agreements as well as the scholarship on globalization in the Latin American context.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2013.824914

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