 Financial nationalism and its international enablers: The Hungarian experienceJuliet Johnson and Andrew Barnes Review of International Political Economy, 2015, vol. 22, issue 3, 535-569 Abstract: Viktor Orb�n and his centre-right Fidesz party won Hungary's April 2010 parliamentary elections in a landslide, running on a nationalist-populist platform of economic self-rule. This paper explores Hungary's financial nationalist turn and its surprisingly successful resistance to IMF and EU pressures to change course. We open by theorizing financial nationalism, and then trace its ideational roots and contemporary character in Hungary. We subsequently argue that two international factors ironically enabled Orb�n to take his financial nationalist ideas from theory to practice: 1) IMF and EU policies that first contributed to Fidesz's electoral victory and then made it difficult to counter Orb�n once in power; and 2) the tolerant behavior of international bond markets. In particular, Orb�n's willingness and ability to use unorthodox, financial nationalist policies to control government deficits and debt both reduced EU and IMF leverage over Hungary and encouraged bond markets to overlook the unsavory politics that produced those numbers. Date: 2015 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:22:y:2015:i:3:p:535-569 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2014.919336 Access Statistics for this article Review of International Political Economy is currently edited by Gregory Chin, Juliet Johnson, Daniel Mügge, Kevin Gallagher, Ilene Grabel and Cornelia Woll More articles in Review of International Political Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.