Coercion in international tax cooperation: identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power

Lukas Hakelberg

Review of International Political Economy, 2016, vol. 23, issue 3, 511-541

Abstract: Tax cooperation puts offshore centers worse off, as their compensation for forgone profits is a hard political sell, and unlikely to produce the same spillover effects on wages and employment as the attraction of foreign tax base. Coercion by a great power thus seems to be a prerequisite for successful international cooperation in tax matters. Great power status is based on internal market size. Governments become substantially more likely to use this power through sanction threats against tax havens when two factors coincide: (1) domestic constraints preventing a shift of the tax burden to labor and consumption and (2) scope for redistributive cooperation benefitting great power banks or multinationals. Hypotheses are tested in an analysis of tax negotiations at OECD level between 1996 and 2014.

Date: 2016
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09692290.2015.1127269 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:23:y:2016:i:3:p:511-541

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rrip20

DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2015.1127269

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Political Economy is currently edited by Gregory Chin, Juliet Johnson, Daniel Mügge, Kevin Gallagher, Ilene Grabel and Cornelia Woll

More articles in Review of International Political Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().