The new interdependence approach: theoretical development and empirical demonstration

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman

Review of International Political Economy, 2016, vol. 23, issue 5, 713-736

Abstract: Mainstream approaches to international political economy seek to explain the political transformations that have made more open trade relations possible. They stress how changing coalitions of interest groups within particular states and changing functional needs of states give rise to new international agreements. While these approaches remain valuable, they only imperfectly encompass a new set of important causal relations. We now live in the world that trade built – a world where greater interdependence has major consequences both for actors' interests and their ability to pursue those interests. A new body of work, which we have called the 'new interdependence' explains how these transformations are playing out. The new interdependence stresses a structural vision of international politics based on rule overlap between different national jurisdictions, which leads to clashes over whose rules should apply when. This not only generates tensions, but also opportunity structures that may help actors to better shape potential solutions to these clashes. However, some actors will have greater access to these opportunity structures, and hence greater influence and bargaining strength – than others. These three factors – rule overlap, opportunity structures and power asymmetries – provide the basis for a compelling understanding of international politics.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1247009

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