Explaining deference: why and when do policymakers think FDI needs tax incentives?

Sarah Bauerle Danzman and Alexander Slaski

Review of International Political Economy, 2022, vol. 29, issue 4, 1085-1111

Abstract: Why do governments compete for investment through tax incentives when there is strong evidence that such packages are inconsequential to the locational decisions of foreign firms? Previous scholarship has attributed pro-business policies such as investment incentives to factors including the structural power of business in an era of international capital mobility, fiscal competition generated through political decentralization or electoral pandering by political leaders. However, there is currently little understanding about how individuals, in their role as decision-makers within government agencies, form beliefs over how to best attract investment. Building on insights from the bureaucratic politics and behavioral economics literatures, we anticipate investment promotion professionals are more likely to view investment incentives as effective attraction tools when they have limited previous experience in the private sector, when they work for investment promotion agencies that are more integrated into the national bureaucracy, and when employee performance is evaluated based on deals closed. We test these expectations with a conjoint survey experiment of investment promotion professionals designed to uncover respondents’ beliefs over the relative importance of different components of the investment environment to firms’ locational decisions, and find substantial support for our expectations.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2021.1885475

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