Trading for survival: trade policy as a credible signal, alliance strategy, and public preferences in Taiwan

Ian Tsung-yen Chen

Review of International Political Economy, 2024, vol. 31, issue 1, 253-276

Abstract: This article examines the connection between trade policy, alliance strategy, and public preferences. It argues that when a contentious trade agreement is perceived as a credible signal for aligning with a powerful adversary (bandwagoning), it is likely to provoke domestic opposition due to its negative impact on state survival. Conversely, when a contentious trade agreement is seen as a credible signal for counterbalancing an adversary with a non-threatening great power (balancing), it is likely to face less domestic resistance as it enhances state survival. Using a comparative case study design, this article compares two cases in Taiwan: the movement against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2014 and the backlash against lifting the import ban on US pork containing ractopamine in 2021. In the CSSTA case, the government’s desired trade partner, China, was not sufficiently supported domestically due to public fears of negative security externalities. In the US pork case, the government sent a cue to the public that a trade deal with the US was a credible commitment required to strengthen the bilateral strategic relationship. This message was echoed by people who recognized the positive security externality and the preservation of Taiwan’s sovereignty and political institutions.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:31:y:2024:i:1:p:253-276

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rrip20

DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2023.2190922

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Political Economy is currently edited by Gregory Chin, Juliet Johnson, Daniel Mügge, Kevin Gallagher, Ilene Grabel and Cornelia Woll

More articles in Review of International Political Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().