The political economy of monetary-fiscal coordination: central bank losses and the specter of central bankruptcy in Europe and Japan

Sebastian Diessner

Review of International Political Economy, 2024, vol. 31, issue 3, 1099-1121

Abstract: Central banks and finance ministries have been faced with growing calls for better monetary-fiscal coordination in recent years as the solution to an array of macroeconomic policy problems, promoted by an ever-wider range of stakeholders. Yet, how can the silver-bullet solution of coordination be expected to play out across very different political-economic contexts? This paper sheds light on this question by introducing a novel typology of monetary-fiscal coordination that can help us make sense of formal and informal coordination efforts in the post-2008 era. It zooms in on a peculiar but key aspect which monetary and fiscal authorities have sought to achieve coordination on: The fiscal backing of central banks’ balance sheets to insure monetary policy against losses and ‘insolvency’. To understand central bankers’ aversion towards loss-making despite their ability to create currency, the paper develops a political economy account which emphasizes policy-makers’ interpretations of their own independence and their desire for fiscal protection, in contrast to traditional accounts of delegation that treat independent agents as discretion-seekers and power-maximizers. The typology is illustrated with case studies of the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan between 2008 and 2023, each representing a different type of monetary-fiscal coordination post-crisis.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2023.2295373

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