Pushing the bar – elite law firms and the rise of international commercial courts in the world economy

Robert Basedow

Review of International Political Economy, 2024, vol. 31, issue 6, 1764-1787

Abstract: In the last thirty years, international commercial courts (ICCs) have emerged around the world. ICCs offer adjudication in international commercial disputes. They are not creatures of international law – as their name may suggest – but specialized domestic courts embedded in national legal orders. The rise of ICCs is remarkable in that scholars expected commercial arbitration to gradually displace litigation in the twenty first century. What drives the creation of ICCs? Legal research suggests that ICCs are a manifestation of a new era of assertive unilateralism in global governance. Scholars point to states’ geopolitical motives, backlashes against private authority in the form of arbitration, and economic statecraft. Drawing on the New Interdependence Approach, this study argues that most ICCs are the result of policy entrepreneurship of elite law firms in the pursuit of growing the global market for commercial litigation. Depending on the legal-political context, they forge coalitions with domestic judiciaries or political leaders to advance ICC projects. The study highlights deep-rooted changes in the global dispute resolution landscape, the important role of commercial law in International Political Economy (IPE), and points to the mostly overlooked significance of law firms and judiciaries as architects of global economic governance.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2024.2357300

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