Digital corporate autonomy: geo-economics and corporate agency in conflict and competition

Dennis Broeders, Arun Sukumar, Monica Kello and Lise H. Andersen

Review of International Political Economy, 2025, vol. 32, issue 4, 1189-1213

Abstract: Many argue that we have entered a new era of international ‘geoeconomic’ relations. Looking at western geoeconomic measures in the digital economy, we specifically focus on the role and agency of private companies in relation to geoeconomic policymaking, and take issue with state-centred international relations (IR) theory on geoeconomics that tends to assume company compliance with government policy. We contend that corporate agency is crucial to understanding the dynamics of geoeconomic policymaking and implementation, especially in the digital domain where tech companies have accrued unprecedented power and position. We introduce the notion of Digital Corporate Autonomy as a characteristic of these companies, which is built on their infrastructural power and facilitated by the increasing informality in the international system. Using this framework, we study the involvement of Big Tech companies in the war in Ukraine and corporate manoeuvring in relation to the United States-Japan-Netherlands semiconductor coalition, against the background of rising Sino-American tensions. Our analysis reveals a broad spectrum of government-corporate interaction and a high level of digital corporate autonomy set against the contexts of war – the height of statecraft – and hegemonic rivalry. We conclude that digital corporate autonomy underlines the importance of scholarly attention to corporate agency and behaviour.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2025.2468308

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