Federal Institutions, State Agency Bias, and Unequal Bureaucratic Responsiveness in the U.S. OSHA Enforcement

Doo-Rae Kim

International Review of Public Administration, 2007, vol. 12, issue 2, 21-32

Abstract: This research demonstrates the importance of the mediating role of agency preference distributions that differentiate the influence of political institutions on bureaucratic agencies. A spatial model is developed in the context of U.S. regulatory federalism to posit that the responsiveness of state agencies to federal institutions will be greater as state agencies exhibit a stronger policy bias by enforcing regulatory rules at an either extremely low or high level. The results of Quantile Regression analysis of state enforcement of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act show that bureaucratic responsiveness to the preferences of the federal institutions is unequal across different state agencies.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/12294659.2008.10805102 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rrpaxx:v:12:y:2007:i:2:p:21-32

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RRPA20

DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2008.10805102

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Public Administration is currently edited by Ralph Brower

More articles in International Review of Public Administration from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().