The Dynamics of Korean Policy Process: Intergovernmental Competition, Political Interests, and Local Welfare Spending

Doo-Rae Kim

International Review of Public Administration, 2008, vol. 13, issue 1, 47-57

Abstract: This research examines two prominent propositions in the welfare policy literature, race to the bottom and electoral dynamics, to reveal the fundamental dynamics of Korean welfare policymaking at the local level. Much of the evidence from the analysis of local welfare benefits and costs in Seoul does not consistently support the proposition of race to the bottom. Although local governments tend to decrease welfare costs in response to neighboring governments’ reductions in welfare costs, they tend not to decrease but to increase welfare benefits at a higher rate than neighboring governments. Moreover, whereas electoral competition leads local governments to bear greater welfare costs, the political leanings of elected local officials do not exert significant influence on welfare benefits and costs. These results together suggest that intergovernmental competition does not necessarily lead to the undersupply of social welfare, and electoral dynamics are not a consistent factor in determining social welfare at the local level in Korea.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2008.10805111

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