A Historical Approach to Regulatory Compliance Research: The Case of Rule 1421 in California

Eungkyoon Lee

International Review of Public Administration, 2013, vol. 18, issue 1, 145-165

Abstract: This research responds to a question of regulatory compliance: Why do regulated entities breach regulations, despite an increased magnitude of formal threat? The research provides theoretical accounts of circumstances under which the anticipated effect of formal threats does not occur. Our task is carried out by examining a deviant case that runs counter to the prediction of deterrence theory. Unlike a majority of deterrence studies adopting statistical analysis, this research employs historical analysis that has great potential to diagnose the intrinsic problems that plague policy implementation. The research suggests that effective regulatory persuasion needs to be based on an analysis of the evolution of the ideas and beliefs internal to regulatees in the historical context in which they have been situated, rather than on purely instrumental reasoning.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2013.10805244

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