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A Policy Paradox from Paternalism to Populism: The Case of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in South Korea

Hae Young Lee

International Review of Public Administration, 2013, vol. 18, issue 3, 233-256

Abstract: The central and local governments of Korea decided upon a massive slaughtering and compensation policy to combat the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the Andong region in 2010 and 2011. This policy action featured a policy paradox involving the Korean government’s paternalistic intervention in farmers’ decisions. Although this paternalism was legally justified, the public criticized the extravagant expenditure to achieve an FMD-free country, and environmental, religious, and civic organizations opposed the indiscriminate slaughter of animals. In the end, the Korean government declared the end of the Andong FMD disaster and publicly announced the policy termination upon the country’s return to being FMD clean. This policy paradox was reinforced by Korea’s populist populism, in which the policy was initiated for economic reasons to recover the country’s devastated livestock farming, not as a consequence of farmers’ united or organized political revolt. This populism was originally captured by Korean politicians’ compassion for those undergoing economic hardship and by the Korean media’s and netizens’ sympathetic attitudes toward farmers. In addition, the populism paved a middle path or an acquittal of the paternalistic policy. Eventually the slaughtering and compensation policy became more perplexing and self-contradictory.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2013.10805271

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