Constitutional concentration of power and dependence on external debt in Africa

Nelson Derrick Nguepi

International Review of Public Administration, 2025, vol. 30, issue 4, 350-380

Abstract: The excessive concentration of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the hands of a single entity or small group, such as the president or the executive, undermines the checks and balances needed to prevent abuses of power and ensure democratic governance. While many studies examine the determinants of foreign debt, few address the role of concentrated constitutional power. This study fills this gap by analyzing the effects of constitutional power concentration on external debt in Africa. Using data from 41 countries over 1995–2014, results show that power concentration significantly increases external debt, fostering opacity, corruption, and poor management of public finances. These findings highlight the importance of adopting transparent and accountable governance policies to reduce dependence on international loans. Strengthening institutional checks and balances is crucial for sustainable and equitable development, ensuring that debt is managed responsibly and aligned with the long-term needs of African populations.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2025.2563680

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