On pragmatic Philosophy and Knightian uncertainty
Stephen John Nash
Review of Social Economy, 2003, vol. 61, issue 2, 251-272
Knight indicates that his proposition of uncertainty is based on two important premises: (a) that the proposition of uncertainty is premised on a reevaluation of the theory of knowledge, and (b) that the primary theory of knowledge used in this re-evaluation may be the Pragmatic theory of knowledge. It is instructive to follow up on the hints that Knight gives, regarding the influences on his work, so as to clarify aspects of Knightian uncertainty for contemporary research. Accordingly, this work first analyzes the main insights of Pragmatic philosophy. Second, the connection between these insights and the definition of Knightian uncertainty is then outlined. Third, some conclusions as to the implications of this analysis are drawn.
Keywords: uncertainty; Pragmatic philosophy; Knight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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