Induced Institutional Innovation and Transaction Costs: The Case of the Australian National Native Title Tribunal

Laura McCann

Review of Social Economy, 2004, vol. 62, issue 1, 67-82

Abstract: The theory of induced innovation says that technological innovations which economize on relatively scarce inputs will be invented and adopted. Hayami and Ruttan have hypothesized that this model also holds for institutional innovations. Coase and Williamson suggest that economic organization, such as vertical integration, is the result of transaction cost minimization. Coase discusses the transaction costs of negotiation versus other alternatives for solving externality problems. This paper brings these previously unconnected threads of the literature together and incorporates transaction costs in an induced institutional innovation model. This conceptual model is brought to bear on the issue of institutional innovations over time in relation to the National Native Title Tribunal. In addition to the reductions in transaction costs from a negotiated settlement rather than litigation, there are other advantages of negotiation. These may include improved “quality” of settlements, improved relations between the negotiating parties, and more timely resolution.

Keywords: transaction costs; induced innovation; property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1080/0034676042000183835

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