Virtue and Behavior
Review of Social Economy, 2009, vol. 67, issue 1, 3-24
This paper supports Amartya Sen's contention that our moral behavior cannot be represented in economic modeling, given the assumptions accepted by most rational choice theorists. In this paper Sen's argument is supplemented by traditional virtue ethics, which can account for how and why “commitment” is counter-preferential. Yet the changes to economic methodology that Sen recommends are rendered unnecessary by a particular innovation in Stoic ethical theory. If the Stoic distinction between indifferent goods and moral goods is invoked, economics can proceed apace, under the assumption that it is the science that handles our behavior in regard to indifferents only.
Keywords: stoicism; ethics; value; virtue; rational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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