Some institutional design for shareholder socialism

Giacomo Corneo

Review of Social Economy, 2019, vol. 77, issue 1, 33-55

Abstract: In times of a declining labour share and an intense international tax competition, some form of market socialism may contribute to hold income inequality in check. However, the concept of market socialism involves three major pitfalls: cronyism, technological stagnation, and power concentration. These pitfalls could be avoided by an appropriate institutional design that includes the combination of public ownership with an extensive use of the stock market, an incentive-compatible mechanism for the takeover of private firms, and participatory democracy.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00346764.2018.1529332 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rsocec:v:77:y:2019:i:1:p:33-55

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RRSE20

DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2018.1529332

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Social Economy is currently edited by Wilfred Dolfsma and John Davis

More articles in Review of Social Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().