Asymmetric information, libertarianism, and fraud
Review of Social Economy, 2019, vol. 77, issue 2, 94-107
This paper argues (a) that while a no-fraud legal requirement does not follow from libertarian first principles, it is not only permitted – but also mandated – by them under certain conditions, and (b) that the claim that some fraudulent exchanges are morally invalid need not appeal to a theory of moral permissibility that is external to those principles.
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