Social coordination problems in classical and Marxian political economy

Duncan Foley

Review of Social Economy, 2020, vol. 78, issue 1, 4-34

Abstract: This paper explores the application of information theory and game theory to questions arising in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and Karl Marx's critical reformulation of Smith's analysis in Capital. After introducing the key theoretical concepts of entropy-constrained behavior and the social interaction model, the paper applies them to some central issues in Marxian and classical political economy: the long-period method analysis of commodity production, the social division of labor, commodity production and money, alienation, and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2019.1605617

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