EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

What if performance accountability mechanisms engender distrust?

Vicki Johansson and Stig Montin

Urban Research & Practice, 2014, vol. 7, issue 2, 213-227

Abstract: An axiomatic assumption in contemporary democratic theory is that accountability mechanisms generate trust and legitimacy in and for democratic systems: in relation to decision-makers (elected officials), facilitators (the public bureaucracy) and outcomes of public policy (scope and quality). However, how wise is it to take this assumption for granted? What if accountability mechanisms applied in democracies with high levels of trust promote distrust rather than trust? This article will elaborate on and analyse the inherent theoretical logic of performance scrutiny as a basis for performance accountability in political-administrative systems inspired by new public management reforms. Performance scrutiny practices derived from Sweden, a high-trust society, are used as empirical illustrations and as a basis to generate hypotheses on how and why practices to analysis performance accountability have the potential to counteract trust.

Date: 2014
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17535069.2014.910925 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rurpxx:v:7:y:2014:i:2:p:213-227

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rurp20

DOI: 10.1080/17535069.2014.910925

Access Statistics for this article

Urban Research & Practice is currently edited by Professor Rob Atkinson

More articles in Urban Research & Practice from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:rurpxx:v:7:y:2014:i:2:p:213-227