Water environment governance under the Central Environmental Protection Inspection mechanism: a collaborative governance strategy from a multi-agent perspective

Yanan Zhao, Lili Zhang and Siyao Li

Water International, 2025, vol. 50, issue 6, 647-675

Abstract: This study analyses China’s Central Environmental Protection Inspection through a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments, enterprises, and central regulators. Results show enterprises adopt green technologies when financial incentives (emission trading, subsidies) outweigh compliance costs, whereas local governments strengthen oversight if central fiscal support offsets enforcement costs. Central inspections align decentralized actors’ behaviours, achieving compliance without performance incentives. Higher emission trading prices and environmental taxes systemically boost green participation, whereas overemphasis on political performance metrics risks long-term inefficacy. Findings guide incentive calibration and institutionalized collaboration in environmental governance.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/02508060.2025.2516299 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rwinxx:v:50:y:2025:i:6:p:647-675

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rwin20

DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2025.2516299

Access Statistics for this article

Water International is currently edited by James Nickum, Philippus Wester, Remy Kinna, Xueliang Cai, Yoram Eckstein, Naho Mirumachi and Cecilia Tortajada

More articles in Water International from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().