Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European Court of Justice improving or destroying welfare?

Jörn Sass and Frank Seifried

Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 2014, vol. 2014, issue 3, 228-254

Abstract: We analyze the effects of mandatory unisex tariffs in insurance contracts, such as those required by a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice, on equilibrium insurance premia and equilibrium welfare. In a unified framework, we provide a quantitative analysis of the associated insurance market equilibria in both monopolistic and competitive insurance markets. We investigate the welfare loss caused by regulatory adverse selection and show that unisex tariffs may cause market distortions that significantly reduce overall social welfare.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/03461238.2012.683450

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