 The separation of information and lending and the rise of rating agencies in the USA (1841-1907)Marc Flandreau and Gabriel Geisler Mesevage Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2014, vol. 62, issue 3, 213-242 Abstract: This paper provides a new interpretation of the early rise of rating agencies in the USA (initially known as 'mercantile agencies'). We explain this American exceptionality through an inductive approach that revisits the conventional parallel with the UK. In contrast with earlier narratives that have emphasised the role of Common Law and the greater understanding of American judges that would have supported the rise of an ethos of 'transparency', we argue that Mercantile Agencies prospered as a remedy to deficient bankruptcy law and weak protection of creditor rights in the USA. The result was to raise the value of the nationwide registry of defaulters which the mercantile agencies managed. This ensured the Agencies' profitability and endowed them with resources to buy their survival in a legal environment that remained stubbornly hostile. Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:sehrxx:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:213-242 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/03585522.2014.950602 Access Statistics for this article Scandinavian Economic History Review is currently edited by Espen Ekberg and Francisco Beltran Tapia More articles in Scandinavian Economic History Review from Taylor & Francis Journals |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.