Member Coordination Costs and Spatial Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Duopsony with a Cooperative

Panos Fousekis

Spatial Economic Analysis, 2016, vol. 11, issue 3, 340-354

Abstract: This paper investigates cooperative spatial entry deterrence. To this end, it employs a dynamic game where an investor-owned firm (IOF) competes with a farmers’ processing cooperative which incurs a fixed coordination cost per member. The results indicate that as the value of coordination cost per member increases or the processing margin rises, it becomes more likely for the IOF to use cooperative limit pricing, that is, to deter the cooperative’s market entry. The opposite is true for an increase in the freight rate.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17421772.2016.1187285 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:specan:v:11:y:2016:i:3:p:340-354

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RSEA20

DOI: 10.1080/17421772.2016.1187285

Access Statistics for this article

Spatial Economic Analysis is currently edited by Bernie Fingleton and Danilo Igliori

More articles in Spatial Economic Analysis from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().