International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

Irene Alvarado-Quesada and Hans-Peter Weikard

Spatial Economic Analysis, 2017, vol. 12, issue 1, 27-49

Abstract: International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A ‘remoteness effect’ is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/17421772.2017.1259494

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