Dynamic Spatial Monopoly with Product Development

Luca Lambertini ()

Spatial Economic Analysis, 2007, vol. 2, issue 2, 157-166

Abstract: Abstract The optimal R&D investment in product innovation of a profit-seeking monopolist is characterized vs that of a social planner in a spatial market with transportation disutility, under full market coverage. It is shown that the planner's incentive to innovate is always weaker than the monopolist's, since the planner trades off the minimization of the social cost of transportation against the cost of R&D.

Keywords: Location; innovation; monopoly; L12; O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/17421770701345459

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