The architecture of the global climate regime: a top-down perspective
William Hare,
Claire Stockwell,
Christian Flachsland and
Sebastian Oberth�r
Climate Policy, 2010, vol. 10, issue 6, 600-614
Abstract:
This article argues that a legally binding, multilateral agreement is a necessary condition for achieving the highest levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions consistent with limiting warming to below either 2°C or below 1.5°C. Clear legally binding commitments within a multilaterally agreed process with strong legal and institutional characteristics are needed to give countries the confidence that their economic interests are being fairly and equally treated. Common accounting rules are needed for comparability of effort, and in order to protect environmental integrity, to demonstrate transparency, for effective monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions and actions, and to facilitate and support a strong international carbon market. Securing full implementation will depend, in part, on the strength of an agreement's compliance mechanism. The Copenhagen Accord, by itself, represents a quintessential 'bottom-up'/'pledge and review' approach. It is open to interpretation whether the Accord can become a stepping stone on the way to strengthening the legally binding, multilateral framework to fight climate change, building on both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, or whether it will lead to the unravelling and fragmentation of all that has been built up to date. Legal architecture choices made in 2010 and beyond are likely to be determinative.
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.3763/cpol.2010.0161
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