The political economy of carbon markets: The CDM and other stories
Peter Newell
Climate Policy, 2012, vol. 12, issue 1, 135-139
Abstract:
Despite ongoing faith in their ability to deliver meaningful reductions in GHG emissions as the Durban climate summit approaches in December 2011 and as the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 looms large, carbon markets have been adversely affected by low prices that are failing to drive necessary investment in low-carbon technology and a series of scandals about their integrity. Some Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have nevertheless delivered reductions in GHG emissions and sustainable development benefits. However, these benefits are too few, and strong incentives still remain in place to go for 'low-hanging fruit' opportunities that bring few additional environmental and developmental gains. Although governance reforms have a part to play in addressing these issues, these are not teething problems that can be easily weeded out with further institutional learning and innovation. They touch on the deeper politics of carbon markets and the role politics play in responses to climate change that have to be addressed.
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2012.640785
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