Achieving additional emission reductions under a cap-and-trade scheme

Paul Twomey, Regina Betz and Iain MacGill

Climate Policy, 2012, vol. 12, issue 4, 424-439

Abstract: Over the last decade, cap-and-trade emissions schemes have emerged as one of the favoured policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions. An inherent design feature of cap-and-trade schemes is that, once the cap on emissions has been set, no additional reductions beyond this level can be provided by the actions of those individuals, organizations and governments within the covered sectors. Thus, the emissions cap constitutes an emissions floor. This feature has been claimed by some to have undesirable implications, in that it discourages ethically motivated mitigation actions and preempts the possibility that local, state and national governments can take additional mitigation action in the context of weak national or regional targets. These criticisms have become prominent in Australia and the US within the public debate regarding the adoption of an emissions trading scheme (ETS). These criticisms and their potential solutions are reviewed. A set-aside reserve is proposed to automatically retire ETS permits, which would correspond to verified and additional emissions reductions. This minimizes the possibility that ethically motivated mitigation actions are discouraged, allows for additional action by other levels of government, while providing transparency to other market participants on the level of permit retirements.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2011.649591

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