Can no-lose targets contribute to a 2°C target?

Vicki Duscha and Joachim Schleich

Climate Policy, 2013, vol. 13, issue 3, 305-327

Abstract: The contribution that no-lose target schemes for non-Annex I (NAI) countries could make to achieve the 2°C target is explored by accounting for the incentives of 18 NAI countries' participation in no-lose target schemes. Using various scenarios, it is shown that implementing uniform no-lose targets as part of the burden-sharing will not lead to global emissions levels compatible with the 2°C target, because uniform no-lose targets will only be beneficial to a few NAI countries. Employing more lenient uniform no-lose targets or individual no-lose targets for large emitters could increase participation by NAI countries and decrease global emissions, global compliance costs, rents by NAI countries, and compliance costs for Annex I (AI) countries. However, the resulting global emissions levels will not be compatible with attaining the 2°C target. Achieving this target will require more stringent emissions targets for AI countries and more lenient no-lose targets for NAI countries. As such, no-lose targets should account for 20% to 47% of global emissions reductions, while due to emissions trading around two-thirds of global emissions reductions should be realized in NAI countries. Indeed, an effective solution may only require no-lose targets for five to seven of the largest NAI countries. Policy relevance No-lose targets are one of a number of instruments discussed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change New Market Mechanism to integrate NAI countries in global emissions reduction efforts. In contrast to binding reduction targets, which apply penalties if a target is not met, no-lose targets provide incentives for meeting a target, e.g. in the form of excess emissions certificates that can be sold on the global carbon market. The presented simulations show that no-lose targets can result in contributions from NAI countries to global emissions reduction efforts. However, the simulations also show that the necessary incentives for no-lose targets need to be adjusted. AI countries require more ambitious targets and NAI countries require less ambitious no-lose targets than proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. Effective no-lose targets may only be required for five to seven of the largest NAI countries.

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Can no-lose targets contribute to a 2 °C target? (2012)
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DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2013.763529

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