'Bubbling' and the Kyoto mechanisms

Erik Haites

Climate Policy, 2001, vol. 1, issue 1, 109-116

Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol allows a group of Annex B countries to fulfill their emissions limitation commitments jointly by forming a "bubble" equal to their collective commitment. Annex B countries, whether members of a bubble or not, can use the Kyoto mechanisms to help meet their emissions limitation commitments. I argue that Kyoto mechanism rules should be applied to Parties individually regardless of their membership in a bubble. This means there are virtually no advantages to joining a bubble, but it is not clear that the option to form a bubble should confer benefits on the members relative to other Annex B Parties that do not join a bubble.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.3763/cpol.2001.0109

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