Clean development mechanism: leverage for development?
Sandrine Mathy (),
Jean-Charles Hourcade and
Christophe de Gouvello
Climate Policy, 2001, vol. 1, issue 2, 251-268
The objective of this paper is to show that the investments through the clean development mechanism (CDM) can exert a leverage effect to (i) make attractive to developing countries non-binding commitments and the adoption of national policies and measures; this comes as a guarantee of non-conditionally of the mechanism to strictly environmental concerns and (ii) create a flow of additional investments and technological transfer from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries. The Indian power sector has been chosen as an example of a sector where institutional barriers, market imperfections, and tariff distortions create a great space for Pareto improvements and leave an important potential for no-regret measures: technological transfer, air conditioned systems, transport infrastructures and removal of subsidies on consumption. This paper presents a micro-economic formalisation on (i) the evolution of profitability of current emitting technologies used in the power sector under the adoption of national policies and measures and (ii) the impact on renewable energy technologies competitiveness of emission credits in the context of CDM. This formalisation has been developed to enable quantitative simulation. A first exercise using the Markal model (used in 77 countries) on the electric sector in India enabled us to simulate the leverage effect of emission credits on additional incomes taken as a proxy for development.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Clean development mechanism: Leverage for development? (2001)
Working Paper: Clean development mechanism: leverage for development? (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:tcpoxx:v:1:y:2001:i:2:p:251-268
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Climate Policy is currently edited by Professor Michael Grubb
More articles in Climate Policy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().