Great expectations: can international emissions trading deliver an equitable climate regime?

Kevin A. Baumert, James F. Perkaus and Nancy Kete

Climate Policy, 2003, vol. 3, issue 2, 137-148

Abstract: Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global 'allocation' of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries. This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an 'equitable' allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end.

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.3763/cpol.2003.0317

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