Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto Protocol

Bjart Holtsmark

Climate Policy, 2003, vol. 3, issue 4, 399-415

Abstract: After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia's potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia's inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices.

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1016/j.clipol.2003.08.004

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