Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without Russia

Erik Haites, Farhana Yamin, Odile Blanchard and Claudia Kemfert

Climate Policy, 2004, vol. 4, issue 2, 143-152

Abstract: This paper examines implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without Russia. It concludes that implementation without Russia is possible, although it requires political will on the part of the countries that wish to proceed with the Protocol. It would lead to higher compliance costs for Annex B buyer regions, but other regions, except Russia, would benefit financially. Russia would forego revenue of at least $20 billion for the first commitment period. Implementation without Russia could improve the environmental performance of the Protocol. It would reduce reliance on Annex B sinks, use of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) for compliance, and the quantity of Kyoto units banked for subsequent commitment periods. Actual emissions by Kyoto Protocol Parties would fall, but the reduction may be offset by leakage to the US and Russia.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2004.9685517

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