The choice of multiple or single auctions in emissions trading

Svante Mandell

Climate Policy, 2005, vol. 5, issue 1, 97-107

Abstract: Whether CO 2 permit auctions should be held on one, several or many occasions per commitment period has not been discussed at any length in the literature. When at all observed, auction frequency has often been set at once per month or quarter. Here, it is argued that for reasons of efficiency, it is generally best to have just one single auction per commitment period. The arguments given relate to the role played by such factors as emission trading design, auction design, market power, transaction costs and, in particular, 'the winner's curse'.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/14693062.2005.9685543 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:tcpoxx:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:97-107

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/tcpo20

DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2005.9685543

Access Statistics for this article

Climate Policy is currently edited by Professor Michael Grubb

More articles in Climate Policy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().