Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO 2 tax

Henrik Hammar and Sverker C. Jagers

Climate Policy, 2005, vol. 5, issue 6, 613-625

Abstract: This article provides an analysis of the support for public policies from a trust perspective. The empirical focus is on the use of a tax on carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), a policy tool aimed at coordinating national emissions targets in Sweden. Among economists and experts in the field of climate policy, a CO 2 tax is viewed as a cost-effective policy. The policy problem is that public support for CO 2 taxes is very low, leaving policy makers with high-cost options. Apart from traditional explanatory variables such as demographic factors, level of education, ideology and self-interest, what can explain this public opposition? Using individual level data, we analyse whether support for increases in the CO 2 tax on gasoline can be explained by citizens' generalized trust in other individuals (who they do not necessarily know) or by their trust in politicians . We find that only the latter measure gains support in a regression analysis. Moreover, when splitting the sample into high-trusting and low-trusting individuals, we find that high-trusting individuals who have access to a car (compared with those without access) are statistically no more likely to resist increases in CO 2 taxes than people without access to a car. Rather, it is individuals with access to a car and who do not trust their politicians who are likely to resist CO 2 taxes.

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2006.9685582

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