A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

Rae Kwon Chung

Climate Policy, 2007, vol. 7, issue 2, 171-176

Abstract: We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change. Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2007.9685647

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