Lessons from carbon markets for designing an effective REDD architecture

Till Neeff and Francisco Ascui

Climate Policy, 2009, vol. 9, issue 3, 306-315

Abstract: Consideration of incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is now formally part of the post-2012 climate change negotiations. A significant amount of financing will be required to make REDD a success, but the design of the REDD architecture can determine the availability of capital. Therefore, in negotiations this should be considered at the same time and on an equal basis with methodological and political considerations. Detailed consideration is given to the type of commitment, the financing mechanism, the level of incentive allocation, and the fungibility of carbon credits, in the context of experience from existing carbon markets. We conclude that a financially successful REDD mechanism would be based on a strong regulatory framework with mandatory targets, market-based, with some degree of project-level crediting, creating fungible REDD credits, subject to a cap.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.3763/cpol.2008.0584

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