Information and rewards: results of a field experiment on printing activity
Grazia Cecere (),
Nick Johnstone () and
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2018, vol. 7, issue 2, 117-129
Improved understanding of the nature and extent of individual concern for environmental issues is crucial for policy makers. The present article uses a within-subject field experiment to measure the impact on the consumption of paper of the provision of environmental information on the one hand and a reward on the other hand. It is found that adding the provision of a reward results in a greater decrease in the consumption of paper relative to the case where there is only the provision of information. However, it is important to note that while intrinsically motivated individuals reduce the consumption of paper in response to the provision of information, for this group there is no effect from the provision of a reward. In terms of policy and managerial implications, it is interesting to note that the different treatments have different impacts depending on the underlying personal norms of the agents. We are also able to test the responsiveness of the subjects to the treatments controlling for demographic characteristics and professional responsibilities.
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Working Paper: Information and rewards: results of a field experiment on printing activity (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:teepxx:v:7:y:2018:i:2:p:117-129
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