Informational nudges and public goods in networks

Benjamin Ouvrard and Anne Stenger

Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2020, vol. 9, issue 3, 281-303

Abstract: We present a model of voluntary contributions for a local public good, with individuals in a fixed network. We consider the introduction of an informational nudge, and model individuals' reaction to the nudge using a moral cost function. Regardless of the regulator's level of information, an informational nudge may induce higher levels of aggregate contributions in circle and complete networks, and reduces strategic uncertainty, as long as individuals' sensitivity to the nudge is high enough (contrary to the star and line networks). If in star and line networks agents' sensitivity to the nudge also matters, the regulator's degree of knowledge regarding each individual position in the network becomes crucial, as the efficiency of our nudge is lowered under incomplete information (it is not possible to send personalized information to each agent). Our main conclusion is therefore that a nudge policy should target specific individuals (those being the most sensitive to the nudge or having the highest interest for the public good) in specific networks (those in which each agent should contribute the same). We finally discuss some ethical concerns related to nudge implementation because of their potential for manipulation.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/21606544.2019.1676826 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:teepxx:v:9:y:2020:i:3:p:281-303

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/teep20

DOI: 10.1080/21606544.2019.1676826

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy is currently edited by Ken Willis

More articles in Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().