 Dynamic incentive model of knowledge sharing in construction project team based on differential gameLingna Lin and He Wang Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2019, vol. 70, issue 12, 2084-2096 Abstract: The construction project team is a demanding, high-stress environment, yet wary participants can be extremely difficult in sharing their knowledge with others. This is a study that targets dynamic knowledge sharing in a construction project team, constructing a dynamic incentive model framework. It is done through the differential game theory, and the application of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is introduced to solve a Nash non-cooperative game and Leader-follower differential games. The results show that the optimal strategy of the Nash game is that agents do not share any knowledge and the principal does not give any incentives. However, the participants will share the cumulative amount of knowledge in the Leader-follower differential games, and the optimal profits of agents and principal are increased as time progressed, and the agents’ effort level of knowledge sharing eventually tending to stability. Date: 2019 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:tjorxx:v:70:y:2019:i:12:p:2084-2096 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2018.1516177 Access Statistics for this article Journal of the Operational Research Society is currently edited by Tom Archibald More articles in Journal of the Operational Research Society from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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