An attack-defense game on interdependent networks
Rui Peng,
Di Wu,
Mengyao Sun and
Shaomin Wu
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2021, vol. 72, issue 10, 2331-2341
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the optimal strategies for an attacker and a defender in an attack-defense game on a network consisting of interdependent subnetworks. The defender moves first and allocates its resource to protect the network nodes. The attacker then moves and allocates its resources to attack the network nodes. The binary decision diagram is employed to obtain all potential states of the network system after attack. Considering each of its opponent’s strategies, the game player tries to maximize its own cumulative prospect value. The backward induction method is employed to obtain the game players’ optimal strategies, respectively. Different resource relationships are analyzed to testify the robustness of the main conclusions and players’ risk attitudes are also investigated. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the analysis.
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:tjorxx:v:72:y:2021:i:10:p:2331-2341
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DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2020.1784048
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