Games on graphs with coalitions

Roy Cerqueti and Emilio De Santis

Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2024, vol. 75, issue 10, 1979-1988

Abstract: This paper models games where the strategies are nodes of a graph G (we denote them as G-games) and in presence of coalition structures. The cases of one-shot and repeated games are presented. In the latter situation, coalitions are assumed to move from a strategy to another one under the constraint that they are adjacent in the graph. We introduce novel concepts of pure and mixed equilibria which are comparable with classical Nash and Berge equilibria. A Folk Theorem for G-games of repeated type is presented.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2023.2290575

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