Impacts of power structure on information sharing in a distribution channel considering the signal game

Hui Cao, Jinjiang Yan and Bocan Shu

Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2025, vol. 76, issue 9, 1898-1914

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of power structure on information sharing in an asymmetric information market. We uncover an intriguing phenomenon: retailers may adopt different information sharing strategies, which may be related to the power structure. Therefore, investigating how the power structure affects retailers’ information sharing strategies is pertinent. We develop a game-theoretic model involving a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer has demand information advantages. Our findings yield several significant insights: Firstly, we demonstrate that being the Stackelberg leader is not always profitable. Being the Stackelberg leader is advantageous for firms in a symmetrical demand information market. However, in the asymmetric demand information market, if the demand information is very valuable, it is detrimental to firms to be Stackelberg leaders. Secondly, we derive the conditions under which the retailer shares demand information. Specifically, if the retailer is the Stackelberg leader, she will choose to share information; otherwise, she will refuse to share information. Thirdly, contrary to conventional wisdom, the retailer’s information sharing does not consistently benefit the manufacturer. If the retailer is the Stackelberg leader, information sharing harms the manufacturer; otherwise, it benefits the manufacturer. Our study provides useful insights for managers to understand and make information sharing decisions under various power structures.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01605682.2024.2447901 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:tjorxx:v:76:y:2025:i:9:p:1898-1914

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/tjor20

DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2024.2447901

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the Operational Research Society is currently edited by Tom Archibald

More articles in Journal of the Operational Research Society from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().