Knowledge sharing and rewards: a game-theoretical perspective

Ulrike Cress and Stefan Martin

Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 2006, vol. 4, issue 4, 283-292

Abstract: Shared databases are used as tools for knowledge management. But contributing knowledge to the database is a public-goods dilemma. Its specific features are multidimensionality of the goods, resource overlap, interdependency of group members and the lack of a marginal unit of return for individual contributions. An analytical model is presented describing the individual- and group-level payoff function. It shows that rewarding contributions with a cost-compensating bonus can be an effective solution not only at the individual level, but also at the group level. Whether or not a bonus system is self-supporting depends on the critical mass of people on average needing a contribution. This depends on the overlap of the people's resources and their interdependency.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.kmrp.8500112

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