Perception differences between buyer and supplier: the effect of agent negotiation styles

Hung-Chung Su, Yi-Su Chen and Young K. Ro

International Journal of Production Research, 2017, vol. 55, issue 20, 6067-6083

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of individual negotiation styles on a buyer’s stated behaviour and a supplier’s anticipation of the buyer’s behaviours with regard to opportunism and compliance in a multi-echelon production network under different firm-level governance mechanisms. We design a between-subjects matched-scenario experiment to collect data from both sides of a buyer‒supplier dyad. We find that agent negotiation styles do exert influences on opportunism but not compliance. Specifically, we find that the effects of firm-level governing mechanisms dominate the effects of individual negotiation styles with regard to compliance, while individual negotiation styles have influence beyond firm-level governing mechanisms with regard to opportunism. Theoretical contributions of our findings to the current literature and managerial implications to practice are discussed.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2017.1324220

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