Credit guarantee mechanism with information asymmetry: a single sourcing model

Cheng-Feng Wu, Mahdi Fathi, David M. Chiang and Panagote M. Pardalos

International Journal of Production Research, 2020, vol. 58, issue 16, 4877-4893

Abstract: This study concerns small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers suffering from cash constraints in operations, money shortages with possible disruptions and cost uncertainty because of the distributor’s supply risk and the information asymmetry. Thus, this study adopts the distributor’s (buyer’s) perspective and applies a credit guarantee mechanism with an incentive contract as a risk management tool. The distributor can adopt incentive contracts to reveal the type of its supplier; the higher the inefficient supplier’s contribution to the distributor, the smaller the gap between procurement contract quantities with the efficient supplier and procurement contract quantities with the inefficient supplier. An insight into practice is that incentive contracts are tools for acquiring ideal suppliers in the supply base and help companies such as Li & Fung enhance their competitive capabilities.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2020.1727039

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